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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, all of whom are directors of a corporation,
brought an Action alleging that a demand letter sent to
one of the Plaintiffs, the president of the corporation,
and to the corporation's counsel, by an attorney on behalf of Defendants, who are shareholders of the corporation, libels the Plaintiffs.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After the Action was filed, Defendants Kenneth D.
Lawson and Ray M. Unrath responded by a timely Motion for Summary Judgment, and, after argument before
the Lower Court, summary judgment was granted against
the Plaintiffs on grounds that even if the statements
complained of were libelous, Defendants and their attorney were privileged to make such statements in connection with judicial proceedings.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants respectfully request that the decision
of the Lower Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants controvert Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts,
in that Plaintiffs are required by Rule 75 (p) (2)-(2) (d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to present the Court
with "a concise statement of the material facts of the
case citing the pages of the record supporting such statement." Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts not only does not
cite the pages of the Record supporting many of its
allegations, but their Statement alleges immaterial matters not contained in the Record such as the educational
background and training of the Plaintiffs and the dates
and circumstances of corporate matters wholly irrelevant
to the question of the propriety of the summary adjudication ordered by the Lower Court.
The material facts from the Record are as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Marketing Systems, Inc. ("MSI") and Com Tel,
Inc. ("Com Tel") entered into a reorganization agreement providing for the transfer of all MSI shares to
Com Tel in return for a certain number of Com Tel shares
and a contingent payout of additional Com Tel shares
to former MSI shareholders (Record at 14-15).
Disputes between Com Tel and the former MSI
shareholders arose concerning the contingent payout of
Com Tel shares. On August 30, 1973, the former MSI
shareholders, Defendants herein, brought suit in the
United States Disitrict Court for the District of Utah
against Com Tel and the directors of Com Tel, Plaintiffs herein, alleging breach of the agreement, unjust
enrichment, unlawful offer and sale of securities, fraud,
and misrepresentation involving moral turpitude and culpability (Record at 11-28).
On September 10, 1973, an annual Shareholders
Meeting of Com Tel was convened and was attended
by Kenneth D. Lawson and Ray M. Unrath, former directors of Com Tel and former MSI shareholders, Defendants herein, and two of their attorneys in the federal suit, John Parsons and James Kruse. Because of
feelings generated by the law suit, the election of directors did not proceed beyond the nomination stage,
the meeting was adjourned "sine die", and no election
of directors was held (Record at 4-6).
On September 25, 1973, John Parsons, acting solely
as counsel for the former MSI shareholders, sent a demand letter by certified mail, return receipt requested,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to D. Kent Wright, President of Com Tel and a Plaintiff
herein, stating that the former MSI shareholders had
been denied their voting rights at an annual meeting of
shareholders which had been adjourned and demanding
reconvention of that meeting, that appropriate information regarding the federal law suit be forwarded to sharehodlers, and that the former MSI shareholders be allowed to forward to all shareholders a statement of their
position concerning the issues raised by the pending litigation. According to Plaintiffs, a copy of the letter was
also sent to the corporation's counsel. The letter also
stated that the actions of Plaintiffs at the meeting were
"opposed to good morals and against public policy" and
that appropriate legal relief would be sought if the demands were not met (Record at 2, 4-10).
On March 9, 1974, the directors of Com Tel filed
the Complaint herein against the former MSI shareholders, alleging that the demand letter was a libel of
the Plaintiffs and held them up to public ridicule and
scorn (Record at 1-10). On April 26, 1974, Defendants
Lawson and Unrath moved the Lower Court for Summary Judgment on the basis that even if the statements
complained of by Plaintiffs were otherwise libelous, there
exists an unqualified privilege of an attorney and his
clients to make such statements in the course of judicial
proceedings or anticipated judicial proceedings (Record
at 45-47). The motion was argued before the District
Court on May 9, 1974, and summary judgment was
granted (Record at 51). Notice of Appeal was filed on
June 5, 1974 (Record at 57).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' appeal from the summary judgment ordered by the Lower Court raises two legal issues:
1. Was the demand letter written by Defendants'
attorney a privileged publication?
2. Are Defendants shielded from liability to Plaintiffs for libel because their attorney's letter was privileged?
POINT I.
A DEMAND LETTER WRITTEN IN RELATION TO PENDING LITIGATION AND IN
CONTEMPLATION OF ADDITIONAL LITIGATION IS AN ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED PUBLICATION.
When a person's utterances further an interest of
paramount social importance, that person is given the
absolute privilege to make defamatory statements which
would otherwise be actionable. Fairbanks Pub. Co. v.
Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alasika, 1964). The privilege is a matter of public policy, Iverson v. Frandsen,
237 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1956) (Idaho law), and
is based upon the necessity of free and open communication. Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222
(1954). See also, Western States Title Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316, 318 (1966); Veeder,
Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 463,
465 (1909).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Under the common law, absolute privilege was first
granted to persons taking part in judicial proceedings.
Developments in the Law — Defamation, 69 Harv. L.
Rev. 875, 920 (1956). The rule, as stated by Lord Mansfield, was that "neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or
Judge, can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for
words spoken in office". Rex v. Skinner, Lofft 55, 56,
98 Eng. Rep. 529, 530 (K. B. 1772). The words had to
be spoken or written "in office", that is, while the person
was acting as judge, juror, litigant, witness, or counsel,
in the performance of the public duty or in the exercise
of the private right upon which the immunity was based.
Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 350 Mo. 572, 166 S,W.2d 1065,
1069 (1943).
The reason for absolute privilege in a judicial proceeding is stated by Judge Van Vechten Veeder:
The absolute immunity of parties litigant
rests upon the public policy which deems it desirable that all suitors, whether malicious and
bold, or conscientious and timid, should have
free access to the conscience of the State with
whatever complaint they choose to make. This
is necessary to a thorough and searching investigation of the truth. Should the parties to
a cause be placed in fear of suits for libel or
slander for reflections cast upon parties or others,
. . . the trial of civil causes would be far less
likely to lead to correct results than where such
. embarassment [sic] was not felt. Perfect freedom to say in their pleadings whatever the parties choose to bring to the consideration of the
court or jury tends obviously to promote the inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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telligent administration of justice. The attainment of this result is of much greater importance
than the prevention of evils arising from reflections on parties or others in the course of an
action.
Absolute Immunity in Defamation, supra, at 477-478.
A. Absolute Privilege In Connection With A
Judicial Proceeding Is Not Limited to Statements Made While A Proceeding Is Actually
Pending.
Because absolute privilege rests upon considerations
of public policy, courts have not limited its scope to statements made during trial. Absolute privilege has been
accorded to a Justice's written opinion, Dodge v. Henriod,
21 Utah 2d 277, 444 P.2d 753 (1968) (Ellett, J., concurring), to a statement by an attorney or his client in
a complaint, Reliance Ins. Co. v. Hollins, 16 Utah 2d 44,
395 P.2d 537 (1964), to a statement in an affidavit supporting an application for a search warrant, Stone v.
Hutchinson Daily News, 125 Kan. 715, 266 P. 78 (1928),
and to an answer made in a deposition. Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 (1955).
In Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405
(1956), the Court held that the recordation of a defamatory notice of lis pendens, even though made outside the
courtroom and involving no function of the Court or its
officers, was absolutely privileged. The Court stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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If the publication has a reasonable relation to
the action and is permitted by law, the absolute
privilege attaches.
295 P. 2d at 409. Accord, Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz. App.
149, 481 P.2d 519 (1971); Smith v. Hatch, 271 Cal. App.
2d 39, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1969).
Indeed the necessity of free speech to a thorough
administration of justice has resulted in this court holding that a statement by an attorney during a consultation with his client, regarding a pending divorce suit, is
absolutely privileged, Beezley v. Hansen, supra, and a
statement by an attorney to opposing counsel made immediately after the taking of a deposition is similarly
privileged. Western States Title Ins. Co. v. Warnock,
supra. Communications between counsel following a trial
and concerning the possibility of an appeal were likewise
held absolutely privilege in Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S. C.
5, 7 S.E.2d 517 (1940), wherein the court stated:
If attorneys cannot freely and frankly discuss
their client's business between themselves, by
word of mouth when they are face to face, or
by letter when separated, and thereby evaluate
and determine their client's rights, then . . . the
rights of all clients before the Courts are seriously endangered and the administration of justice is handicapped.
7 S. E. 2d at 517.
The leading case is Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2d 32 (8th Cir. 1966) (Iowa law), involving allegedly
defamatory utterances of an attorney at a time when
no judicial proceeding was pending. A false story about
Johnston, a regional director for the United Auto Workers ("UAW"), was published in a newspaper during the
heat of an election campaign by the UAW to replace a
union already representing the employees of Kiowa Corporation ("Kiowa"). Cartwright was counsel for Kiowa
and for the newspaper. After the election, the newspaper
printed a retraction concerning the story and when Cartwright was asked about the story, he stated, "The story
came to us on pretty good authority . . . I'm not at liberty to divulge where it came from". 355 F. 2d at 34.
This statement was also published in the newspaper.
When Johnston brought suit against Cartwright, Kiowa
and the newspaper, the District Court held that Cartwright's words were absolutely privileged. On appeal,
Circuit Judge (now Justice) Blackmun stated:
It is true that [Cartwrigbt's statement] was not
uttered at the precise moment litigation between Cartwright or his client Kiowa or his newspaper client, on the one hand, and the UAW or
Johnston, on the other, was pending or when
judicial control was immediately at hand. But
it was made when the heat of the controversy
remained, when the board [N. L. R. B.] election
was just concluded, and when an accusation of
falsity and libel and a challenge to prove, obviously communicated to Cartwright, had been
made by a representative of the UAW. All signs
Pointed to incipient litigation and to the necessity for protective action . . . [Cartwright] was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mindful of a probable suit against his client . . .
[and the statement] was made in the course of
his professional office . . . in connection with possible litigation. (Emphasis added.)
355 F. 2d at 37.
Thus, it is clear that the cloak of absolute privilege
is not conditioned upon the formalism of filing a complaint, but is based upon a public policy which demands
open communication and candor when litigation appears
imminent and an attorney is called upon to present the
claims or defenses of one of the adverse parties.
B. Limitations On Absolute Privilege In Connection With Judicial Proceedings.
Courts have not permitted persons to use absolute
privilege to protect themselves from liability for defamatory statements which are concerned with matters totally outside the scope of pending or impending litigation.
The English common-law rule covered any utterance
reasonably related to a judicial proceeding, even though
the statement was irrelevant to any of the issues.
BOWER, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 91-92 (2d ed.
1923). American Courts are said to have restricted the
rule so that an "entirely foreign and irrelevant defamation" may be actionable. PROSSER, TORTS 778-79 (4th
ed. 1971); 50 AM. JUR. 2d, Libel and Slander, Section
236. Nevertheless, an utterance is considered relevant to
a proceeding if it has some relation or reference to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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subject of inquiry. Johnston v. Schlarb, 7 Wash. 2d 528,
110 R2d 190, 195 (1941); 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
Sections 585-589 (1938). According to Professor Prosser,
"all doubts [are] resolved in favor of the defendant — a
conclusion which seems in effect to adopt the English
rule". Prosser, supra at 779.
A typical application of the American rule is found
in Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P. 2d 707 (1953),
which involved a defamatory letter written by an attorney to a Disitrict Judge and three interested attorneys,
concerning a brief filed by an attorney whom the letterwriter had replaced. In holding that the letter was an
absolutely privileged statement, the Court noted:
Expressing objections and requesting action in
the form of a letter to a District Judge, and
serving copies of the same on other counsel is
a customary practice well recognized and often
followed. The letter was written with reference
and relation to the subject matter of the cause
being litigated . . . Proceedings connected with
judicature . . . are so important to the public
good it is only in extreme cases and circumstances that a libelous publication in a judicial
proceeding can be used as the basis for damages
in a libel suit.
255 P. 2d at 708-709.
Thus, it appears that an "entirely foreign and irrelevant defamation" is not privileged, but that a defamatory statement which has some relation or reference to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the subject matter of a pending or contemplated action
is protected.
Within these limitations, it is clear that the case
upon which Plaintiffs rely in their Brief herein, Union
Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 83 F. 803 (9th Cir. 1897),
is a properly decided case. (Appellants' Brief at 9). Derogation of the character of the attorneys who filed a life
insurance suit is certainly a foreign and irrelevant defamation; the character of the attorneys had nothing at
all to do with the pending suit. The case is, of course,
distinguishable from this present Action because the
demand letter written by Defendants' attorney was written with reference to the disputes pending before the
federal court and was concerned with the continuation
of those disputes at the Shareholders' Meeting and possible litigation resulting therefrom. The letter was not
an "entirely foreign and irrelevant defamation".
C. Utah Law Is Not Contrary To The Foregoing Summary Of The Law.
Appropriate Utah cases have been noted above and
they uphold Defendants' contentions as to the applicable
law. Indeed, this Court has previously cited with approval 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Section 586 and
Comment A. thereto (1938), which state:
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged
to publish false and defamatory matter of another in communications preliminary to a proDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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posed judicial proceeding, or in the institution
of, or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto.
•

• •

[The attorney's purpose in publishing the
defamation and his knowledge of the falsity of
the matter] are of importance only in determining the amenability of the attorney to the disciplinary power of the court of which he is an
officer.
See Beezley v. Hansen, supra.
Plaintiffs intimate that the Legislature may have
changed the foregoing rules by enacting 5A UTAH CODE
ANN. Section 45-2-3(2) (1953), which provides:
A privileged publication which shall not be
considered as libelous per se, is one made
(2) In any publication of or any statement
made in any legislative or judicial proceeding,
or in any other official proceeding authorized by
law.
This statute is contained in Title 45 of the Code,
entitled "Newspapers and Radio Broadcasting". Section
45-2-3 deals with a "privileged publication" and Section
45-2-10, which is almost identical, deals with a "privileged
broadcast". These statutes do not seek to define a "judicial proceeding", in the context of an attorney's absolute
privilege but to establish the qualified privilege of a
newspaper, radio broadcaster, or other publisher to reDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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port statements made in official proceedings, whether
or not the statements would otherwise be libelous per
se. See Prosser, supra at 830-33.
D. Application Of Law To The Facts Of This
Oase.
This present Action is well within the rule as applied
by Justice Blackmun in Johnston v. Cartwright, supra,
and as stated in 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS Section 586
(1938). Indeed, cases involving facts similar to this case
have arisen in Ohio and New Mexico and both courts held
against the Plaintiffs on the question of absolute privilege.
In Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 36 A.L.R. 3d
1321 (6th Cir. 1968) (Ohio Law), an attorney wrote an
allegedly defamatory letter to another attorney, regarding a possible will contest, at a time when administration
proceedings were pending. Copies of the letter were sent
to persons interested in the estate. The District Court
dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. On appeal, the dismissal
was affirmed, the Court of Appeals holding that the
letter was an absolutely privileged communication.
The New Mexico case, Romero v. Prince, 85 N. M.
474, 513 P.2d 717 (Ct. App. 1973), involved a dispute
between brother and sister over a tract of land. The
sister, acting as administratrix for her parents' estate,
filed suit against her brother in 1968. In 1970, the sister
leased the land to a rancher who was later informed by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the brother that the estate did not have title to the land.
The rancher consulted with the attorney who represented
the brother in the title suit and, in May, 1971, the
brother's attorney sent a letter concerning the dispute
and requesting an accounting to the attorney for the
estate, with a copy to the rancher. The sister and her
husband then brought suit against the brother's attorney
alleging among other things that the letter was libelous
of them. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant, and, the Court of Appeals, assuming
the statements in the letter were libelous per se, affirmed.
The appellate court held that the brother's attorney was
absolutely privileged, in connection with a pending title
suit and a possible action for an accminting, to send the
letter wncerning his client's interest, to opposing counsel and to an interested party.
The demand letter involved in the instant case was
written by Defendants' attorney in his capacity and office
as counsel for Defendants. The circumstances in which
the letter was written were wholly the result of disputes
within the corporation which resulted in the filing of the
federal suit. The Shareholders' Meeting was adjourned
sine die because of the continuation of those disputes
during the election of directors. The demand letter referred to the pending federal suit no less than six times
(See Record at 4-8), and also referred to the possibility
of additional litigation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Clearly this is a case where not only was litigation
actually pending to which the writing of the demand
letter was related, but but also where all indications at
the time pointed to the necessity for protective action
and a probable additional suit, and where the statement
made by the attorney was made in the course of his professional office.
POINT II.
AN ATTORNEY'S CLIENT IS ACCORDED
THE SAME PRIVILEGE AS THE ATTORNEY IN CONNECTION WITH A PENDING
OR POSSIBLE ACTION.
Plaintiffs may have sought to avoid the problems
associated with the absolute privilege accorded to an
attorney's statements in a judicial proceeding by naming
the Defendants as the responsible parties' defendant.
However, it has been consistently held that the privilege
of parties to a judicial proceeding is co-extensive with
that of counsel. Mr. Justice Cardozo, while sitting on the
New York Court of Appeals, stated:
There is no difference in respect of a degree between the privilege of counsel and that of parties
and witnesses. They are phases of the same immunity.
Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N.E. 431, 343
(1918); accord, Thourot v. Hartnett, 56 N. J. Super. 306,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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152 A.2d 858 (1959); Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120, 49 N.W. 2d 521 (1957); Ginsberg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951), cert, denied,
343 U.S. 934 (1952) (Kentucky law).
Chief Justice Shaw, speaking for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass.
(3 Met.) 193 (1841) gave the reasoning for the co-extensive privilege:
We can perceive no substantial difference between the case of counsel and that of a party.
The privilege is extended to the counsel for the
interest and benefit of the party, and to allow
him full scope and freedom in the support or
defense of the rights of the party.
44 Mass. at 193.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment granted by the Lower Court
should be affirmed because:
(1) The allegedly defamatory letter was written
by Defendants' attorney in his office as counsel and in
relation to pending and impending judicial proceedings,
and the letter was sent solely to interested parties; therefore, the letter was an absolutely privilege communication.
(2) The absolute privilege of parties being co-extensives with that of their counsel, Defendants cannot
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be held liable in an action for damages for words written
by their attorney in relation to a judicial proceeding.
Respectfully submitted,

PARSONS, KRUSE
& CROWTHER
By THOMAS N. CROWTHER
Attorneys for Defendants
Kenneth D. Lawson
and Ray M. Unrath

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY
DEC 5 1975
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

